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Lecture
Dyson Distinguished Lecture:
Precedent and Policy in Constitutional

Law*
HARRY W. JONESt

There is always a rush to judgment at the end of a Supreme
Court term; decisions come down by the dozen during the final
weeks as if the Justices were college students working frantically
to meet the deadlines on their semester essays. Is it that the
Justices, like the rest of us, tend to put things off until the very
last minute? Or is it, as is so often asserted, that the Court has
an impossibly heavy workload? Or could it be that the Court's
collegial deliberations move more slowly than they would if the
Justices got along better with each other? Whatever the explanation, it was rush hour again as the Court wound up its business at the close of October Term, 1981. The concluding installment (No. 18A) of Volume 102 of the Supreme Court Reporter,
delivered to my rural mailbox late last summer, ran to approximately five hundred pages, exclusive of cumulative tables, key
number digests, and memorandum decisions. The cases reported
are all decisions handed down by the Court from June 28
through July 2. Most of them, as is usual nowadays, are constitutional cases.
I have had the subject of this Dyson Lecture in mind for a
* The inaugural Dyson Lecture was delivered March 21, 1983, at Pace University
School of Law. The Dyson Distinguished Lecture Series is made possible by the gift of
Charles H. Dyson through the Dyson Foundation. The purpose of the endowment is to
encourage outstanding scholarly contributions and enrich the academic life of the faculty
and students at the School of Law and Pace University.
t Cardozo Professor Emeritus of Jurisprudence, Columbia University, New York,

New York.
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long time, so when Number 18A of the advance sheets came in, I
decided that I would read this certainly fair sample of contemporary decisional literature to see what it had to tell us; not
about the state of the substantive law on the particular constitutional issues involved in the reported cases but, more generally,
about the sources and methods employed by the Supreme Court
in constitutional adjudication. That, after all, is what matters
most in the long view. Specific constitutional doctrines change
drastically from era to era, often turning right-about-face from
one direction to its opposite, but the essential modes of judicial
reasoning and explanation do not change all that much, or at
least have not in the past one hundred and fifty years of constitutional decision making by the Supreme Court of the United
States. Suppose, then, that we put all our preconceptions aside
for the moment and try to read the constitutional cases of last
June 28 through July 2 with a fresh eye. What methodological
phenomena strike us, or should strike us, as we proceed in our
reading from case to case?
What is certainly most striking, or would be if familiarity
had not made us take it for granted, is that two-thirds or more
of the discussion in the opinions is about past Supreme Court
cases that is, about what these past cases arguably "held" and
what was said in the opinions of the Court justifying the results
reached in them. The Supreme Court, it would appear, spends a
very great part of its time and energy examining and reexamining its own past work and the work of Supreme Courts that have
gone before. The applicable clauses of the Constitution itself are
mentioned in the October Term, 1981 opinions, usually by such
rubrics as "first amendment" or "equal protection clause," but
the constitutional text is rarely set out, except perhaps in a footnote, and the constitutional issue in the case is practically never
so stated as to include an exact quotation of the crucial words of
the constitutional precept in point. The tests brought to bear in
determining the validity or invalidity of challenged governmental action are, instead, formulated in terms that paraphrase or
refine the simpler and usually more general words of the Constitution itself. A few examples should be enough to illustrate what
I mean. The original Constitution and its amendments nowhere
speak of "levels of scrutiny," "compelling state interest," or
"right of access," as the Court's recent opinions do in discrimi-
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nation cases, church-state cases, and press cases respectively.
These terms, central as they are in the rhetoric of present-day
constitutional adjudication, had their origin in what I shall call
the constitutional case law.
Is it heresy against conventional political theory to suggest
that American constitutional decision making is not in any serious way the interpretation of a text, the Constitution itself, but
the application of a body of decisional doctrine? The constitutional text is down there somewhere under this massive overlay
of case law development and refinement, but the usual contest
between advocates in the Supreme Court, and more often than
not between or among the Justices, is the kind of contest that
has characterized the common law judicial process at least since
the days of Sir Edward Coke, a battle over cases and what they
should be taken to stand for. When a dissenting or separately
concurring Justice takes sharp issue with his prevailing colleagues, his - now, happily, his or her - usual reproach is that
the opinion of the Court embodies a misreading or even a misrepresentation of some past Supreme Court decision or decisions. At some time during the October Term, 1981, every Justice of the Supreme Court accused one or more of his or her
colleagues of this offense against the institution of judicial precedent. Every Justice, at some time during the Term, was also so
accused.
One of Sir Isaiah Berlin's great essays begins with this quotation from an ancient poet: "The fox knows many things, but
the hedgehog knows one big thing." 1 I am determined to be a
"hedgehog" in this inaugural Dyson Lecture. There are many
mansions in the house of constitutional law, many things worth
knowing about it. But my "one big thing," the single insight I
consider more important for the understanding of American
constitutional processes than anything else that might be said
about them, is that American constitutional law is essentially
case law, a system in which the decisions of the Supreme Court
and other courts are guided and structured by precedent. The
literal text of the Constitution, as formulated in Philadelphia in
1787 and formally amended from time to time, figures in con-

1. I. BERLIN, THE HEDGEHOG AND THE Fox: AN ESSAY ON TOLSTOY'S VIEW OF HISTORY
1 (1970).
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temporary constitutional adjudication only at one remove, that
is, as the words of the original text have been construed, expounded, and developed by successive generations of Supreme
Court Justices.
In the two centuries of our life as a constitutional republic,
a vast and intricate exegesis has been imposed on the lean text
of the original constitutional document. In speaking of constitutional "text" and judicial "exegesis," I am of course borrowing
from the vocabulary of theology, and it is there that we probably
find our best analogy. The constitutional case law relates to the
constitutional text, quantitatively and operationally, about as
the Halachah - the voluminous body of commentaries and decisions deemed authoritative by religious Jews - relates to the
Torah, the five books of Moses from which the Halachah remotely proceeds. The Torah is of the first rank in the hierarchy
of authority, but it is to the Halachah one customarily looks for
guidance on more specific issues of right conduct. Or, to put the
analogy another way, the constitutional case law relates to the
text of the Constitution, quantitatively and operationally, about
as the vast literature of systematic theology and Christian ethics
relates to the teachings of Jesus as recorded in the gospels of
Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John. There is nothing far-fetched or
in any way cynical about this theological analogy. It is simply
the best way I know to drive home my point that the student or
practitioner of constitutional law, or the constitutional judge, is
working not just with a text but with an authoritative literature,
authoritative because the doctrine of precedent makes it so. If
the doctrine of precedent, or as I often shall call it, the "institution" of precedent, were not applicable in the universe of constitutional law, past decisions of the Supreme Court would not, of
course, have that authoritative status. But, as we shall see, that
bridge was crossed a long time ago.
II
It was not self-evident to the framers of the Constitution
that judicial precedents would be of central importance in the
determination of constitutional questions by the Supreme Court
and other courts. Indeed, it was by no means self-evident that
such issues were for the courts at all, at least not clear that questions of the meaning and effect of the generally worded clauses
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of the Constitution were to be decided authoritatively and
finally by appointed judges rather than by duly elected congressmen and presidents. This very great point, the authority of the
courts to deny enforcement to federal and state legislation that
the court considers unconstitutional, was settled in 1803 by the
decision in Marbury v. Madison.2 This was the first case in
which the Supreme Court held a federal statute void as beyond
the powers delegated to Congress by the Constitution. This is
not the place for still another discussion of whether Chief Justice John Marshall and his Supreme Court colleagues were right
or wrong, as a matter of history, in asserting this "hitherto unheard-of,"3 as Holmes called it, power of judicial review. The
historical question is a close one, but for practical political purposes it is a dead issue. Marbury v. Madison settled the question
and has become a given, an underlying assumption, of American
governmental theory. Senators and congressmen disgruntled by
particular Supreme Court decisions attempt from time to time
to withdraw classes of controversial cases from the Court's appellate jurisdiction, but it has been a long time since anyone has
seriously proposed that Marbury v. Madison be overruled by
constitutional amendment.
Practically every student of law, history or political science
knows Marbury v. Madison by name, and rightly so because of
the momentous consequences the institution of judicial review
has had in American political, economic, and social development. But something else of great importance, perhaps equal
importance for the future of our legal institutions, happened
more quietly as soon as the Marshall Court, by its decisions in
such great first-impression cases as McCulloch v. Maryland4 and
Gibbons v. Ogden,5 had provided the building blocks for what a
civil lawyer would call a constitutional "jurisprudence." We now
find the Justices deciding - or, better, taking it for granted that the common law doctrine of precedent is to apply in constitutional cases.
This carrying-over of the method of precedent to constitu-

2. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
3. O.W. HOLMES, John Marshall, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 270 (1920).
4. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
5. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
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tional law was not logically foreordained. The "Supreme Law" of
the Constitution is qualitatively different from ordinary law,
more like the "higher law" of the natural law theorists than like
ordinary legislation. It might certainly have been contended that
the constitutional text was the compact to which the people and
the states had agreed and that the text alone, and not the past
rulings of courts, should be looked to in constitutional adjudication. And what about John Marshall's admonition in McCulloch
v. Maryland that "we must never forget, that it is a constitution
we are expounding"?O Since the Constitution is designed not as
a short run measure but as a charter for the ages, why should
past rulings be given weight in the ongoing construction of its
provisions? Before the doctrine of precedent had taken hold in
constitutional cases, could it not have been argued strongly that
the Justices should interpret the general mandates of the Constitution in the way that best meets the conditions and needs of
a present time - and not be deferential to decisions that may
have been handed down when political and social problems were
quite different?
The arguments against the use of precedent in constitutional cases were surely there, or so hindsight tells us, but they
seem never to have been raised or seriously considered by early
Supreme Court Justices or by any of the lawyers who appeared
before them. Without the slightest fanfare, the principle of stare
decisis makes its appearance in constitutional law; Supreme
Court decisions interpreting the Constitution are to be authoritative, are to be precedents that must be taken account of when
a once-interpreted constitutional clause comes before the Court
again.
This taken-for-granted extension of the theory of precedent
to the then-new area of constitutional adjudication is best accounted for by looking at it in the context of early American
legal history. The War of Independence severed the political ties
between the former colonies and the British Crown, but the
American patriots had had no quarrel with the English common
law; indeed, it was their sturdy claim in the Declaration and Resolves of the First Continental Congress that "the respective col-

6. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 407.
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onies are entitled to the common law of England"" and were being deprived of it by the ministers of George III. So, after
independence, American judges and lawyers did not renounce
their English legal inheritance. What occurred instead was the
great and formative development, largely completed by the second decade of the nineteenth century, known to us as the "reception" of the common law in the United States.' One of the
things "received," and unquestionably the most important, was
that distinctive common law policy, the doctrine or institution of
precedent. American lawyers of the time - like George Wythe,
John Marshall's law teacher at William and Mary - were used
to reasoning by reference to precedent. Common law ways of
thinking were ingrained in them by their training and experience, and they would have thought of other methods of legal
analysis and justification as arbitrary and outlandish. If someone
had asked John Marshall or Joseph Story why the doctrine of
precedent should be applied in constitutional adjudication, the
almost certain reply would have been: "Why not?" The Constitution is, of course, legislative in form, but it was well established by this time in common law courts that the doctrine of
precedent applies fully to judicial decisions interpreting the language of statutes; if a court has interpreted a statute as having a
certain meaning, it is generally bound to give it that same meaning when like cases arise in the future. Now, in the United
States, this policy is to apply to decisions interpreting the Constitution. No one jumped up to say: "Look what the Supreme
Court is doing!" Everybody took it for granted that that was the
only way to do it. And virtually everybody still does.
III
We move now to consider how the mode of reasoning by
reference to precedent conditions the exercise of judicial power
and the development of constitutional doctrine. Here, unavoid7. Declarationand Resolves of the First Continental Congress October 14, 1774, in

DOCUMENTS

ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE FORMATION OF THE UNION OF THE AMERICAN STATES

1

(Libr. of Congress 1927).
8. See generally Jones, The Common Law in the United States: English Themes
and American Variations, in POLITICAL SEPARATION AND LEGAL CONTINUITY 91 (H. Jones
ed. 1976).
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ably, I have to begin by refreshing your recollection about the
status of precedents as sources of law in the "common law family" of countries, which includes our country, England, and most
of the nations of the Commonwealth. What are the traditional
and accepted norms for the use of precedents, not just in constitutional cases but in cases generally? The theory of precedent, I
make bold to suggest, is in one respect like Roscoe Pound's great
theory of social interests; everybody knows about it and talks
with assurance about it, but hardly anyone has given much
thought to it or has more than a hazy and incomplete idea of
what it is. So I shall not apologize at all for getting back to
basics for the next few minutes. Reasoning with and from precedents is the distinctive mode in which lawyers think in common
law countries; a lawyer who is not knowledgeable about and
comfortable with precedent is like a musician who has never
quite learned to read music. If I were running a law school, I
would insist that a refresher course on the doctrines of precedent be offered and required in each of the six law school semesters - and in every program of continuing legal education.
The precedent idea is easy to state in a very general way:
past judicial decisions are generally binding for the disposition
of similar present controversies. That sounds, at first impression,
like a simple prescription for staying put, for doing over and
over again what a court has once done. The rule of precedent is
usually understood as being essentially this, and nothing could
be farther from the truth than that simplistic impression. I have
come to think that great confusion is caused by the incautious
use of "stare decisis" as if that phrase were a synonym for, interchangeable with, "doctrine(s) of precedent." It embarrasses
me gravely that I have been making this terminological mistake
all my life, in fact up until tonight. Stare decisis is, of course,
shorthand for stare decisis et non quieta movere - stand by the
past decisions, and do not disturb settled things - which is sensible enough, even though it is a kind of doggerel Latin hexameter 9 of uncertain origin. But stare decisis, the notion of staying
with what has once been decided, is only one aspect of a far
more complex idea; in the observable work of the courts, there is
much more to precedent-thinking than forbearance from upset9. M.

RADIN, HANDBOOK OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY
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ting the apple cart.
The institution of precedent is not a single doctrine but a
whole cluster of doctrines which, taken together, leaves far more
room than is commonly supposed for development and change
in the ongoing case law, and so for the infusion of policy considerations into the decisional mix. Here, briefly put, are the interrelated propositions that together constitute the precedentcluster:
(1) Precedents are generally binding for the decision of future cases.
(2) But a decision is a full-fledged precedent only for future
"like" cases, that is, for future cases involving the same material
facts.
(3) It is the court's decision, not the court's opinion, that is
the precedent for the future; anything said in the opinion that is
not necessary to the decision of the case then before the court is a
"dictum," which may be "persuasive authority" in a future case
but is in no way binding. (Analytically, I suppose, this is a corollary of Proposition 2, but judicial usage is such that it is better to
state it separately.)
(4) Even a full-fledged precedent is only "generally" binding,
not absolutely binding, for future cases.
That is the best I can do by way of a systematic breakdown
of the essential ingredients of the precedent-cluster. If the analysis is not as elegant or airtight as it might be, it is probably
because nobody else has ever tried to do anything quite like it. I
think the analysis is essentially right, and I am reasonably sure
that it does not leave out anything of significance.
The four propositions of my precedent-cluster set the
ground rules for the interplay of precedent and policy in constitutional adjudication. When and how do considerations of public
policy enter into the constitutional decisions of the Supreme
Court, and how is the influence of these policy considerations to
be discerned in cases which purport to be mere "followings" of
what the Court has decided or said before?
We begin with Proposition 1, the stare decisis proposition
of my precedent-cluster, and take as our illustrative precedent
0 which is unthe great case of Brown v. Board of Education,1
10. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).

9

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 4:11

doubtedly familiar to everybody. In Brown v. Board of Education, handed down in 1954, the Supreme Court ruled that racial
segregation in a state's public schools is unconstitutional as an
abridgement of "equal protection of the law" guaranteed to all
persons by the fourteenth amendment. If another case of racial
segregation in the public schools should reach the Supreme
Court next year, Brown v. Board of Education would be an authoritative precedent; the Court would be bound - or "generally bound" as the phrase goes - to decide the new case the
same way. This is so clear under the theory of precedent that it
is altogether unlikely that pro-school segregation forces, if such
still exist, would even bother to appeal their case to the Supreme Court. And, of course, no lower court would think of disputing the principle established by Brown v. Board of
Education.
This is the aspect of precedent that everybody knows. No
occasion for policy arguments in this following of a clear precedent, you would say, and you would be almost right, "almost"
because stare decisis, fidelity to past decisions, is itself a public
policy, one that ranks high in the hierarchy of legal values because of the importance of equality and predictability of decisions. Our illustrative case is otherwise a simple one. Yet it is
appropriate to begin with this case to make it plain that there
are constitutional cases, plenty of them, in which the regular application of precedent, without more, rules the day and accomplishes a substantial saving of judicial time and energy. Why
then, it is sometimes asked, are there so few "clear," precedentcontrolled constitutional cases in the United States Reports and
the Supreme Court Reporter? If there are such clear cases, why
is it that the Supreme Court never seems to get one, but instead
decides most of its controversies by votes of 5-4, 6-3, or 4-2-2-1?
The answer, of course, is that the truly precedent-controlled
cases, or potential cases, are disposed of finally in the lower
courts or brushed off by per curiam decisions of the Supreme
Court or -

and this is incomparably the biggest category

-

never brought at all. The great effect of the policy of stare decisis is to deter litigation that might otherwise be brought. Federal
judges, and particularly Supreme Court Justices, regularly tell
us that they are being swamped by constitutional litigation.
They would have been drowned long before now if adherence to
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol4/iss1/2
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precedent were the exception rather than the general rule.
We have just been talking about clear precedents. Now we
turn to past decisions that are less than that. Proposition 2: A
judicial decision is generally binding only in future "like" cases,
that is, in future cases involving the same material facts. If a
later controversy involves what the court considers materially
different facts from those of the past case, the past decision is
not controlling authority. The cases, the court will say - or may
say - are "distinguishable on their facts." We use the same
great decision as our illustration. Brown v. Board of Education
was decided in 1954. Soon thereafter, other racial segregation
cases reached the Supreme Court, including one in which the
challenged city ordinance provided, not for school segregation,
but for the maintenance by the city of racially segregated bathing beaches. Manifestly, by just about any imaginable standard,
Brown v. Board of Education was not a full-fledged "precedent"
in that case; the material facts - schools in one case and
beaches and bath houses in the other - are not the same, and
the Supreme Court could have ruled, without in any way violating the norms of precedent-theory, that Brown v. Board of Education was distinguishable on its facts and that segregation of
purely recreational facilities was still constitutionally permissible. Actually the Court did nothing of the sort. It struck down
the beach segregation ordinance, too," but this, you will readily
see, was not a mere "following" or application of precedent but a
significant extension of the formerly limited rule against racial
segregation to a new and "materially" different social area. Mind
you, I am not talking about the result in the case, of which I
warmly approved, but about the reality of what the Court did as
a matter of elementary legal analysis.
What we have here is one of the characteristic and most important ways in which judicial judgments of public policy operate, often decisively, not opposed to but within a precedent system. Brown v. Board of Education was somewhat analogous to
the beach case, in that the two cases had one material fact, racial segregation, in common. And the existence of the Brown v.
Board of Education decision on the books narrowed the policy
issue to something like: "Is there any reason, in fairness and
11. Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (per curiam).

11

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 4:11

constitutional equity, to treat schools and bathing beaches differently for purposes of the equal protection clause?" Counsel
for the challengers of the discriminatory ordinance had a far
better case than they would have had if Brown v. Board of Education had never been decided. But Brown v. Board of Education did not control the decision in the bathing beach case, and
it would be disingenuous for the Court or anyone else to pretend
that it did. If, as we postulate, the Court's decision in a case like
this is not controlled by the formal legal sources, it must be controlled or strongly influenced by the Court's policy judgment,
that is, by the views of the Justices, or a majority of them, as to
which of the possible decisions in the new case is more just and
socially desirable. And in such a case, the traditions of our legal
system require that the Court, in its opinion, tell us why - that
is, for what reasons of justice or social policy - the Court considers one of the possible decisions a sounder solution of the new
problem than the other. There is no place for the hidden ball
trick in the common law judicial process, and certainly not in
constitutional adjudication. If policy considerations have been
influential, as they so often are, in the decision of a constitutional case, the Court has a political and moral obligation to tell
us what these considerations were.
My guru, Karl Llewellyn, had a saying: "Dictum is in the
eye of the beholder, meaning the court later on." This brings us
to the third norm in my precedent-cluster. Proposition 3: It is
the court's decision that is the precedent, not what the court
says in the judicial opinion justifying that decision. If the court's
published opinion contains language that was not necessary to
dispose of the factual controversy that was then before it, that
language is not binding in any sense; it is, as we lawyers say,
mere "dictum," something said by the way, and can, if the court
in a later case so chooses, be disregarded. We recur to our racial
segregation illustration. Suppose for the moment that the opinion of the Court in Brown v. Board of Education had included,
as it did not, this sentence: "The equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment requires that all students in the public
schools be treated equally and forbids any segregation of students in separate schools or separate classes by reason of race,
gender or scholarly aptitude." Analytically, that imagined sentence would have been dictum in Brown v. Board of Education,
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol4/iss1/2
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going as it does far beyond the issue then before the Court, and
the Court, in a later case challenging separate schools for boys
and girls or separate "tracks" for fast and slow learners, would
be entirely free, if it so chose, to disregard the dictum altogether.
Free to disregard the old dictum, yes, and yet free, if the Court
now considered it a sound statement of constitutional policy, to
reaffirm it, even to quote it in full in support of its decision in
the new case.
Inevitably there is something elusive, even tricky, about the
status of dicta and its use by lawyers and judges, particularly in
constitutional cases. A court is in no way bound to "follow" mere
dicta, but it may, and often will, treat an old dictum as "persuasive," often very persuasive, authority. (If I ever write a book on
the subject, I shall be tempted to dedicate it to Mr. Nixon and
call it "Tricky Dicta.") When will the Supreme Court dismiss an
overbroad statement in one of its past decisions as dictum or
"mere dictum"? Only one answer seems possible: whenever the
Court in a new case is persuaded that the old statement, if
brought to bear now, would lead to an unsound disposition of
the constitutional problem now squarely presented to the Court.
And when will the Supreme Court quote the old dictum and give
it weight as persuasive authority? Whenever the Court, in its
new case, believes that the old statement, although analytically
dictum when first announced, expresses sound constitutional
policy and should now be raised to the status of authoritative
constitutional law. Either way - brushing off the old dictum or
drawing on it for support - the Court is exercising a policy
judgment as to what is best for society and for the sound development of constitutional law. We note again how misleading it is
to see the issue, as so many do, as an issue of precedent versus
policy. In constitutional litigation, as everywhere else in American case law, policy considerations operate, as they must operate, within the precedent system.
Last but not least in our inventory of the norms of precedent comes Proposition 4: Even a full-fledged precedent is only
generally binding, not absolutely binding, for the decision of future cases. "Generally binding," you will say, "can't you do better than that?" I wish that I could formulate Proposition 4 more
precisely, but the actual cases intractably resist anything more
definite. "Generally," let it be conceded, is a weasel word, an
13
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imprecise way of saying that an American court will follow clear
precedent almost all the time, that is, except when it is persuaded, in unusual and quite undefinable circumstances, that it
should overrule the precedent and declare a new principle for
the future. (The system has been somewhat different in England, but we will not get into that.) The doctrine of precedent,
in short, is not what a philosopher would call a categorical imperative but a rule of imperfect obligation.
We have to be careful not to overstate this long-established
escape hatch from the general policy of stare decisis. Courts, by
and large, hate to overrule their past decisions. They prefer,
when they can with some appearance of reasonableness, to put
inconvenient old rulings aside as factually distinguishable or, as
we have just seen, as dicta that were not necessary to the actual
decision of the earlier case. But if today's controversy is not honestly distinguishable from the decision of, say, ten years ago, a
modern court, if convinced that the old rule is seriously disadvantageous as law for today, will bite the bullet and overrule the
precedents.
When a court explicitly amends the case law by a flat overruling of theretofore authoritative precedents, it acts much as
Alexander the Great did in Phyrigia where, instead of trying to
untie the intricate Gordian knot, he drew his sword and severed
it with one blow. Such abrupt cuttings of the Gordian knot of
precedent are memorable; anyone can see that pragmatic considerations have overpowered the policy of stare decisis in this dramatic instance. Perhaps this is why literal-minded commentators often make the mistake of trying to quantify the change a
court has wrought in the case law during a year or an era by
tabulating the number of its explicit overrulings. This is a misleading and simple minded exercise, because it misses the point
that most changes in the decisional law, as we have seen, are
accomplished in less dramatic ways, such as the extension of
precedents by the method of analogy to situations beyond the
material facts of the older cases, and the discounting as "dictum" - or acceptance as strongly persuasive authority - of
broadly worded statements in past judicial opinions. A direct
overruling of precedent is improbable in any case; there is a
heavy burden of persuasion on the advocate who urges the court
to overrule its clear precedents and break a wholly new path.
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol4/iss1/2
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But the possibility of an overruling is always there and it is not
to be forgotten as an element in the precedent-cluster, not to be
forgotten, particularly, when we are looking at the constitutional
case law.
Justice Brandeis wrote years ago that "stare decisis . . .is
not a universal, inexorable command ' 12 in constitutional cases,
and the late Justice Douglas, in 1949, listed no fewer than fortyeight explicit overrulings of constitutional precedents by the Supreme Court during two periods adding up to fifty-two years,
eighteen between 1869 and 1890 and thirty between 1937 and
1949.13 Does this mean that adherence to - and reformulation
of -- precedent is less the norm, and explicit overruling less the
exception, in constitutional law than elsewhere in the American
case law system? This is commonly said to be the case, and an
intellectually attractive theory has even been developed to explain the supposed difference: bolder use of the method of overruling is necessary in constitutional matters because unsound 'or
outmoded constitutional case law cannot be corrected by ordinary legislation, as other judicial errors can, but only by the
cumbersome process of constitutional amendment. The Supreme
Court, so the theory goes, must take responsibility for the overruling of its socially disadvantageous constitutional precedents
because they are likely to stand uncorrected if the Court itself
does not strike them down. I find the theory entirely persuasive,
but I am not at all sure of the existence of the phenomenon the
theory purports to explain. Stare decisis is not an "inexorable
command" in constitutional cases. But is it an inexorable command in any other field of American law? It does not appear to
be so in property and contract cases where there is a probability
that the parties, at the time of their transaction, really knew of
and relied on the case law rule under challenge. If we examine,
however, the areas of private law that do not involve this element of probable reliance - manufacturers' liability, for example, or the law of torts generally - my guess is that we would
find the incidence of explicit overrulings of precedent about the
same as in constitutional law. But, on any showing, stare decisis
is not a more inexorable command in constitutional law than it

12. Washington v. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219, 238 (1924) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
13. Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLUM. L. REv. 735, 739, 743 (1949).

15

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 4:11

is elsewhere in our legal order; overrulings of precedent occur at
least as often in constitutional adjudication as anywhere else.
Proposition 4 of our precedent-cluster fully holds, and has exceptional and perhaps unique importance, in the development of
constitutional law.
IV
In Number LXXVIII of the Federalist Papers, Alexander
Hamilton sought to quiet apprehensions that the proposed new
federal judiciary might exercise "an arbitrary discretion" by assuring his readers that the judges would be "bound down by
strict rules and precedents, which serve to define and point out
'1 4
their duty in every particular case that comes before them.
His contemporary, Lord Chief Justice Mansfield would have told
Hamilton not to be silly, that a precedent system does not and
cannot work that way. The norms of case law reasoning may at
times conceal the influence of policy considerations, but policy
judgments are not, and cannot be, excluded from the decisional
process. In a Supreme Court opinion, you will never find a paragraph that begins: "Read this carefully now, because we are talking about policy for the next few sentences." But anyone who
knows where and how to look will see policy - which inevitably
means the Justices' considered views of what is best for society
and for the efficacious development of constitutional law - everywhere at work in the difficult decisions that come to that virtually final tribunal. For, as we have seen, it is considerations of
public policy, not of formal logic, that must determine in any
case whether the principle established or pointed to by the past
decisions is to be broadened or narrowed, reaffirmed or overruled. These can be fighting issues when there has been a substantial recent reconstitution of the membership of the Supreme
Court, as when a "Taney Court" succeeds a "Marshall Court" or
a "Burger Court" succeeds a "Warren Court."
Once it was decided, a century and a half ago, that the doctrine(s) of precedent apply in constitutional law, the traditional
precedent norms became the rules by which the great game of
constitutional adjudication is to be played. It is absurd for any-

14. THE
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No. 78, at 529 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
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one, particularly for scholars, to expect that the constitutional
case law can ever attain the conceptual unity and perfectly consistent logical structure of a scientific system like mathematics
or physics. No such structure can be built up case by case in the
mode of precedent, and I am not at all sure that we would like a
perfectly "scientific" constitutional case law if it were within the
power of any Supreme Court to bring one into being.
It does not trouble me that considerations of policy, and so
the public policy views of individual Supreme Court Justices, influence and must influence the decision of constitutional cases
and the development of constitutional doctrine. To be sure, the
policy preferences of a majority of the Justices at any given time
may not be my policy preferences, as they happen not to be at
the moment. But then, in constitutional law as elsewhere in life,
"you lose a few, and then you win a few." All you and I, or any
critic, can fairly demand of any set of Supreme Court Justices is
that they adhere in good faith to the decisional norms of our
precedent system and give us in their opinions a full and genuine explanation of the reasons, and the line of reasoning, that
brought the Court to its decisions. When a Supreme Court fails
to do that, it deserves criticism, and the more scathing the
better.
Would we have had a better constitutional world if the doctrine(s) of precedent had never been extended to the universe of
constitutional law? That is a nice abstract question and might
be a good subject for a lecture even longer than this one. I, for
my part, am happier with our system of reasoning from precedent than I would be with any other I can think of. In any event,
our precedent-centered system of constitutional adjudication is
the only one we have, or are ever likely to have, and the urgent
thing is that we understand the dynamics of its operation. That
is what I have tried to deal with in this inaugural Dyson
Lecture.
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